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Abstract
Most approaches in algorithmic fairness constrain machine learning methods so
the resulting predictions satisfy one of several intuitive notions of fairness. While
this may help private companies comply with non-discrimination laws or avoid
negative publicity, we believe it is often too little, too late. By the time the training
data is collected, individuals in disadvantaged groups have already suffered from
discrimination and lost opportunities due to factors out of their control. In the
present work we focus instead on interventions such as a new public policy, and in
particular, how to maximize their positive effects while improving the fairness of
the overall system. We use causal methods to model the effects of interventions,
allowing for potential interference–each individual’s outcome may depend on who
else receives the intervention. We demonstrate this with an example of allocating a
budget of teaching resources using a dataset of schools in New York City.
1 Introduction
Machine learning is used by companies, governments, and institutions to make life-changing decisions
about individuals, such as how much to charge for insurance [27], how to target job ads [33], and
who may likely commit a crime [36]. Thus, it can be used to give people an opportunity or deny it.
Recently, a number of striking examples of bias against sensitive attributes such as race or gender
have raised awareness about potential downsides of algorithmic decisions. For example, Google’s
advertisement system was more likely to produce ads implying a person had been arrested when
the search term was a name commonly associated with African Americans [32]. In another case,
algorithms that learn word embeddings from news articles resulted in sexist associations such as
“woman” being associated with “homemaker” [5].
Partially in response to these examples, there has been much recent work aimed at quantifying and
removing these biases [4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 14–20, 22, 24, 28, 34, 35, 37]. In large part, these works have
used observational data to quantify fairness with various measures and correct for it. Unfortunately, it
is rarely clear which measure is right for a given problem, and we cannot resort to combining them as
many are mutually incompatible [18, 28]. Alternatively, causal approaches [17, 19, 24, 37] allow the
modeler to design customized fairness measures via domain-specific causal graphs.
However, in this work we argue, that if machine learning is now really changing people’s lives
with its decisions, then we have an opportunity to not only make fair predictions, but to alter the
unfairness in the system itself. In agreement with [3] we argue in favor of exploiting interventions
to mitigate associations between important outcomes and sensitive attributes (i.e., race, sex, gender
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identity, sexual orientation, or otherwise). To do so we draw upon the well-established tools of causal
inference for interventions. Inspired by the causal notion of counterfactual fairness [19] we design
counterfactual quantities to measure how much an intervention weakens the association between an
outcome and a sensitive attribute. These quantities measure how much an individual benefits from an
intervention purely because they are members of a privileged group. We introduce an optimization
procedure to find an intervention maximizing total benefit that simultaneously weakens this privileged
association. We demonstrate our method on a real-world dataset to assess the impact of funding
advanced classes on college-entrance exam-taking.
2 Background: Counterfactual Fairness
Counterfactual fairness [19] is a definition of fair predictors that is based in causal models. Let A be
a (set of) protected attribute(s), Y an outcome of interest and X a set of other features. A predictor Yˆ
of Y satisfies counterfactual fairness if it satisfies the following criteria:
P (Yˆ (a) = y | A = a,X = x) = P (Yˆ (a′) = y | A = a,X = x), (1)
for all a, a′, y, x in the domains of A, Y , and X . The notation V (a′) represents a counterfactual
variable corresponding to a factual variable V .1 It represents the counterfactual statement “the value
of V had A = a′ instead of the factual value”. As used by [19], counterfactuals are defined within
Pearl’s Structural Causal Model (SCM) framework [25]. This framework defines a causal model by a
set of structural equations V[i] = g[i](pa[i], U[i]), which correspond to a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
G where pa[i] are the observable parents of V[i] in G, and U[i] is (set of) parent-less unobserved latent
causes of V[i].2 The counterfactual “world” is generated by fixing A to a′, removing any edges into
vertex A, and propagating the change to all descendants of A in the DAG, as shown in Figure 1 (a),
(b). Any variables in the model that are not in A ∪X , and are not descendants of A, can be inferred
given the event {A = a,X = x}, as the remaining set of equations defines a joint distribution.
The motivation behind (1) is that the protected attribute should not be a cause of the predicted
outcome for any particular individual, other things being equal (in this case, the non-descendants
of A in the DAG). Informally, it translates as “we would not make a different prediction for this
person had this person’s protected attribute been different, given what we know about them” (the
prediction is probabilistic if it depends on unobserved variables). This is in contrast to non-causal
definitions which enforce observational criteria such as Y ⊥ A | Yˆ (calibration [13]), or Yˆ ⊥ A | Y
(equalized odds [14]). As discussed by [7, 18], in general it is not possible to enforce both conditions,
particularly if A 6⊥ Y . This will happen if A is a cause of Y : in a SCM if A is an ancestor of Y in
the DAG. In a nutshell, counterfactual fairness can be interpreted as building a predictor Yˆ that is not
a descendant of A if we augment the system with a vertex representing the predictor, as in Figure
1 (c). Within the family of predictors satisfying such dependencies, predictive accuracy of Yˆ with
respect to Y is maximized. The recent survey [23] provides an extensive overview of causal thinking
in fairness problems and the role of counterfactual fairness in particular.
In this formulation, the world itself might be unfair in the sense that Y is caused by A, but we have
the freedom of setting our predictor in a way where Yˆ is not causally affected by the protected
attribute. In an important sense, this only addresses an injustice in the world in an indirect way. If A
is “race”, Y is “person will default a loan”, and A is a cause of Y , counterfactual fairness emphasizes
making predictions of loan default that excludes information about unfair events. But it can only
do so indirectly, and hope that this makes a change in the long run in the causal paths from A to Y .
Formalizing the interplay between Yˆ and the changes in the causal graph would require longitudinal
data on the adoption of Yˆ and/or many assumptions about the dynamics of society. While such issues
are just starting to be considered in the literature (we are aware of only one other work [21], which is
complimentary to ours), our goal here is to directly distinguish the relationship between A and Y to
have immediate impact. To do so, our approach is to leverage existing work in causal interventions,
and to link them to formal counterfactual definitions of fairness. We introduce our approach below.
1Our notation is slightly different but equivalent to the one in [19].
2We use boxed subscripts [i] to index the ith variable/feature and unboxed subscripts j to denote the jth
individual. Also, an edge from a set of variables X to another variable Y will mean each feature in X causes Y .
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Figure 1: (a) A simple causal graph with two features X[1], X[2] besides the protected attribute A and
outcome Y . Variables named U represent hidden variables. (b) A counterfactual system representing
the fixing A to some value a′, explicitly showing new vertices where necessary: vertices “V (a′)” are
labeled “V ” whenever they are not descendants of A. (c) The same graph, augmented by a choice of
Yˆ that does not change across counterfactual levels.
3 Problem Formulation and Solution
We consider the interventional problem, which complements the prediction problem described in the
previous section. In this scenario, we assume that we have the opportunity of altering the existing
relationship betweenA and Y by performing interventions in the system. Within the SCM framework,
the concept of “perfect intervention” is one of its primitives: modifications in the causal process
of the world that can be represented by breaking edges in the causal graph. For example, if it was
possible to perform a perfect intervention on X[2] in the graph of Figure 1(a), this would imply the
deletion of the edge A→ X[2]. No propagation from a′ to Y would occur in the graph of Figure 1(b).
Perfect interventions are often impossible in real problems in social science. Otherwise, a direct
intervention on Y would solve the problem. Instead, we consider “soft,” or imperfect interventions
that alter the relationship between A and Y without removing the pathways. As commonly done
in the literature [31, 25, 8], we can represent interventions as special types of vertices in a causal
graph which index particular counterfactuals. For instance, if each individual i is given a particular
intervention Zi=zi, we can represent its counterfactual outcomes as Yi(zi), and the corresponding
causal graph will include a vertex Z pointing to Y . This vertex does not represent a random variable,
but the index of a choice of intervention. In particular, we will adopt the convention “Zi = 0” to
denote that no intervention is applied to unit i: instead, Zi = 0 denotes that we let the ith instantiation
of the system run its “natural regime.” In Figure 1(a), we have a graph defined to represent the natural
regime of a system. We could define Z =“set variable X[2] to x[2]” as the perfect intervention on
X[2], adding an edge from Z to X[2]. In general we could have Z being a parent to all vertices, with
Z = z representing a particular choice of conditional distribution for each vertex given their parents.
3.1 Assumptions
We consider interference models, where interventions applied to one individual affect other individuals
[30, 11]. That is, it is allowed that Zi 6⊥ Yj for i 6= j. As in [2], we will not be concerned about direct
causal connections between different outcomes {Yi, Yj}, focusing exclusively on the intention-to-treat
effects of {Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn} on {Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn}, where n is the number of individuals.
As discussed in the previous section, each individual i has a set of features represented as a vector
Xi, and each individual belongs to a sensitive group Ai. For each individual i, we decide to perform
intervention Zi. For simplicity of presentation, we will assume throughout that each Ai, Zi are
binary, with Zi=0 representing the “idle” choice of making no direct intervention on i. In contrast to
the usual definition of counterfactual fairness where the only counterfactual index is given by the
protected attributes, we will use Yi(ai, z) to denote the counterfactual outcome for individual i with a
fixed protected attribute Ai = ai and control signal z ≡ [z1, z2, . . . , zn]ᵀ where zi is the assignment
to intervention variable Zi. In particular {Y1(a1,0), . . . , Yn(an,0)} is the set of outcomes where we
decide to leave the system unperturbed.
In a causal graph, each outcome Yi is assumed to be directly influenced by the individual’s sensitive
group Ai, features Xi, and the intervention Zi, represented by the edges:
Ai → Yi Xi → Yi Zi → Yi.
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These correspond to inputs to a structural equation for Yi, as described by [25, 26]. We further assume
that a pre-defined set of “neighbors” of i, defined as N(i) ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , n}, influence i. Specifically,
their interventions will influence the outcome of i. This is represented as {Zj}j∈N(i) 99K Yi, where
99K signifies either an indirect or direct ‘spillover’ causal effect: that is, Zj 99K Yi is a shorthand
notation for possible paths such as Zj → Yj → Yi or Zj → Yi. We do not explicitly model any
connections among outcomes, as our objective function will not require this information.
Finally, we assume that there are no edges from any Zi into any Xj . We can interpret X as features
observed prior to intervention, with Zi possibly changing hidden variables Hi not in X but acting as
mediators in pathways such as Ai → Hi → Yi or Zi → Hi → Yi (Hi may be observed after the
action takes place, but not conditioned on). The idea explored in the next section is that we choose
z by first observing all A and X to achieve some measure of fairness within a set of n individuals.
Edges from Ai, Xi to Z are omitted for simplicity. Like in the original counterfactual fairness work
[19], we will assume that there is a model that maps inputs {Ai}ni=1, {Xi}ni=1, {Zi}ni=1 to outputs{Yi}ni=1. For instance, [1, 2] provide some methods for this task. Our focus is not on estimating
a causal model: such a model is assumed to be given either by prior experiments or by fitting
observational data under causal assumptions. Rather, we focus on defining a measure of fairness for
new cases where {Ai}ni=1, {Xi}ni=1 have been observed but {Yi}ni=1 has not occurred yet.
Figure 2 shows a simple example where two individuals are neighbors and thus, there is possible
interference between their individual interventions.
3.2 τ -Controlled Counterfactual Privilege
A2
Z1 Z2
X2X1 Y1 Y2
A1
Figure 2: An example causal diagram with action ver-
tices Z, outcomes Y , features X , and sensitive group A.
Here, individuals 1, 2 are neighbors of each other, thus
their interventions may ‘spillover’ in possibly indirect
ways, as shown by the dashed arrows. Edges ◦-◦ rep-
resent arbitrary causal connections between Xi and Ai.
We omit any edges between Y1 and Y2 for simplicity.
Without perfect interventions we cannot guaran-
tee Yi(a, z) = Yi(a′, z) via some z. But even
if this was possible, we must still specify how
Yi(a, z) is preferable to Yi(a,0): for instance,
it is undesirable to have a policy that removes
unfairness by crashing the economy to ensure
everyone has zero income. Unlike the predic-
tion problem that just attempts to reconstruct
Yi(a,0), in this control problem we need to con-
sider which outcomes are desirable. Assuming
Y is a probabilistic outcome, we proceed by
choosing: i) a summary of the distribution of
Y that we want to control; ii) an objective func-
tion; iii) an appropriate notion of approximate
control of unfairness. We will use expected val-
ues to summarize the distribution of each Y ,
and assume without loss of generality that Y is
encoded such that larger values are preferable.
Objective. Our goal is to assign (binary) interventions z to maximize the sum of expected outcomes
over individuals subject to a maximum budget B:
z? ≡ argmaxz
n∑
i=1
E[Yi(z) | Ai = ai, Xi = xi], (2)
s.t.,
n∑
i=1
zi ≤ B
where ai, xi are the factual realizations of A and X , for individual i. As discussed previously, this
conditional expectation is assumed to be given by a pre-defined causal model for relational data,
well-defined for our target outcomes regardless of the neighborhood of each individual [1, 2].
Constraints: Bounding Group Privileges. With a causal graph we can define privilege as having a
better outcome because of ones value of the protected attribute, i.e. E[Yi(a,0)] > E[Yi(a′,0)]. Based
on this, we might consider interventions z inducing “approximate fairness”E[Yi(a, z)] ≈ E[Yi(a′, z)],
for instance by enforcing |E[Yi(a, z)]−E[Yi(a′, z)]| <  for some predefined . This does not clarify
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what happens to features Xi, which might lie on the pathway between Ai and Yi and cannot be
simply conditioned on [19]. Moreover, since the problem is a maximization problem, it is less clear
why bounding absolute differences is sensible. Before we present a formal definition, let us introduce
a motivating example below.
Example: Housing Subsidies
Consider two individuals, 1 and 2, such that {X1, X2} are their professional qualifications
in some quantitative scale, and Yi(ai, [z1, z2]) are their counterfactuals of interest: total
income in the next 10 years, in thousands of dollars. Suppose that Zi = 1 corresponds to
the action “individual i gets a subsidy to move to a neighborhood with convenient transport
links”, and suppose our budget for this program is such that z1 + z2 ≤ 1, for zi ∈ {0, 1}.
Individual 1 is of a minority group A1 = b and Individual 2 is of majority group A2 = w.
Suppose that there is discrimination in society against group b and that there is no interference
between individuals. In particular, assume the structural equation:
Yi = Xi + 100Zi + 50Zi × I(Ai = w) + Ui,
where I(·) is the indicator function and the error term Ui has zero mean. In this case, being
in group w gives an extra boost if the corresponding individual is given the chance of
moving. If X1 < X2 + 50, the solution to this optimization problem is to set Z2=1. Even if
Individual 1 is more qualified than Individual 2 by up to 50 units, maximizing the “total well-
being” E[Y1(z1) | b, x1]+E[Y2(z2) | w, x2] still favors the individual in the privileged group.
The problem is amplified if there is interference, for instance, if giving the treatment to
Individual 2 increases the chances of the neighborhood of Individual 1 having fewer people
of group w, leading to a fall of property prices and neighborhood decay. A model can capture
that by adding both Z1 and Z2 to each structural equation, penalizing Yi for each interaction
Zi × I(Ai = w) such as the following:
Yi = Xi + 100Zi + 50Zi × I(Ai=w)− 10I(Zi=0)×
∑
j{Zj × I(Aj=w)}+ Ui. 
In the above example, the structural equation for Yi is assumed to be a fact of society. We cannot
change the equation, but we can change its inputs. In particular, we are interested in bounded privilege
constraints. If we adopt the constraints:
E[Yi(ai, z) | Ai = ai, Xi = xi]− E[Yi(a′, z) | Ai = ai, Xi = xi] < τ, (3)
for some τ >0 and all a′ in the domain of A, and i∈{1, . . . , n}, we exclude treatment assignments
that allow an individual i to gain more than τ units in expectation due to the interaction of z and Ai.
The interpretation of constraint (3) is that if individual i has an increase in (expected) outcome that is
due (by at least a margin τ ) to belonging to group ai, then this is defined as unfair privilege.
In general, the constraint in eq. (3) requires full-knowledge of the specific form of all structural
equations3. For example, if some Xi,[k] is a descendant of Ai, then in general Xi,[k](ai) 6= Xi,[k](a′).
To avoid that, we can exclude all descendants of Ai (but Yi, which is the outcome to be predicted
instead of observed evidence) and fit a model that will not require any structural equation except for
the outcome. Note that this assumes we can block any confounding between A and Y (which can
be done nonparametrically either by randomized controlled trials or knowledge of the causal graph
combined with particular adjustments [25, 31]). Thus we propose a variation of the above constraint:
EM≺ [Yi(ai, z) | Ai = ai, X≺i = x≺i ]− EM≺ [Yi(a′, z) | Ai = ai, X≺i = x≺i ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gia′
< τ, (4)
where X≺i is the subset of Xi that are non-descendants of Ai in the causal graph, andM≺ is a causal
model that excludes all observed non-descendants of A but Y . Notice that the objective function (2)
can use all information in Xi, since there is no need to propagate counterfactual values of Ai. Hence,
this formulation uses two structural equations for the outcome Y , one including Xi and one including
X≺i . The advantage of (4) is not requiring structural equations for any variables other than Y , which
in general would require assumptions that cannot be tested even with randomized controlled trials
3Depending on the causal graph, it may be possible to identify the desired functionals without complete
knowledge of the structural equations [24].
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[23, 19]. In contrast, the objective function and constraints (4) can at least in principle be estimated
by experiments. The fair optimization problem is therefore:
max
z1,...,zn
n∑
i=1
E[Yi(z) | Ai = ai, Xi = xi] (5)
s.t.,
n∑
i=1
zi ≤ B
Gia′ ≤ τ ∀a′ ∈ A, i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where A is the domain of A and τ > 0. We call a treatment assignment satisfying the constraints
above as τ -controlled counterfactual privilege.
The Optimization Framework As the difference between an approximate solution and a globally
optimal solution could mean the difference between a fair and an unfair solution, and as the problems
we are interested in are often only hundreds or thousands of interventions, we propose an optimization
procedure to solve it exactly. Our formulation will accommodate any function form for the structural
equation for Y . To do so, we formulate eq. (5) as a mixed-integer-linear-program (MILP). To avoid
fractional solutions from the MILP for intervention set z, we use integer constraints to enforce that
each intervention zi is binary in the final solution. Given a set of n individuals, we assume that for
each individual i there are at mostK other neighbor individualsN(i) whose interventions interfere on
their outcome Yi. Let these interventions be called zN(i). We begin by introducing a fixed auxiliary
matrix E ∈ {0, 1}(2K ,K). Each row ej corresponds to one of the possible values that zN(i) can take
(i.e, all possible K-length binary vectors).
Additionally we introduce a matrix H ⊆ {0, 1}(n,2K) where each row hi indicates for individ-
ual i, which of the 2K possible neighbor interferences affect Yi (i.e., each row is a 1-hot vec-
tor). We will optimize H jointly with z. This allows us to rewrite the objective of eq. (5) as:∑n
i=1
∑2k
j=1 hi,jE[Yi(zN(i) = ej) | Ai = ai, Xi = xi]. Note that we introduce a sum over all
possible zN(i) and use H to indicate which element of this sum is non-zero. We can rewrite the
fairness constraints in a similar way. To ensure that each row hi agrees with the actual zN(i) we
enforce the following constraints: I[ej = 1]hi,j ≤ zN(i) and I[ej = 0]hi,j ≤ 1 − zN(i), where I
is the indicator function that operates on each element of a vector. The first constraint ensures that
the non-zero entries of ej are consistent with zN(i) via hi,j , and the second ensures the zero entries
agree. Finally, to ensure that each row of H is 1-hot we introduce the constraint
∑2K
j=1 hi,j = 1 for
all i. This yields the following optimization program:
max
H,z∈{0,1}
n∑
i=1
2K∑
j=1
hi,jE[Yi(zN(i) = ej) | Ai = ai, Xi = xi], (6)
s.t.
2K∑
j=1
hi,j
(
E[Yi(zN(i)=ej) | Ai=ai, X≺i =x≺i ]− E[Yi(zN(i)=ej) | Ai=a′, X≺i =x≺i ]
)
< τ, ∀a′, i
I[ej = 1]hi,j ≤ zN(i), ∀i, j
I[ej = 0]hi,j ≤ 1− zN(i), ∀i, j
2K∑
j=1
hi,j = 1, ∀i
n∑
i=1
zi ≤ B.
Path-specific and Multiple-model Variants. Following the original exposition of [19], we have
described the case where all paths from A to Y in the causal graph carry a notion of unfairness. It is
possible to extend the constraints above to “path-specific” effects, a concept exploited by other causal
formalisms such as [17, 19, 24, 37]. Although the extension to path-specific counterfactual fairness
is a natural one, its notation can get cumbersome [23, 6], and as such we defer the discussion to a
longer version of this paper. Likewise, [29] discuss how to accommodate multiple competing models.
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Solution Paths, Feasibility and Ineffective Interventions. A practitioner does not need to commit
herself to a single choice of τ . We may interpret this problem as multiple-objective optimization
problem that maximizes with respect to z and minimizes with respect to τ , which leads naturally to
exploring a whole solution path of possible values of τ and reporting the corresponding trade-off. In
particular, it is possible that τ must be relatively large for a problem to be feasible. For instance, if
the structural equation for Y is additive on Zi, such as Yi = I(Ai = w) + Zi + Ui, then no solution
will be feasible for 0 ≤ τ < 1. Moreover, as there is no interaction between Ai and Zi, solutions
will be trivial in the sense that they cannot reduce the gap among the counterfactuals compared to
z = 0. This is not a problem due to the definition of τ -controlled counterfactual privilege: it is solely
the consequence of having an ineffective class of interventions, an issue that cannot be solved by an
algorithm but by real-world design.
4 Experiments
Zi Zj
Pi
Ci
YiFi
Ai Aj
Pj
Cj
FjYj
race
FT school 
counselors
calculus
intervene
SAT/ACT
AP/IB
Figure 3: The causal model for the NYC
school dataset.
We now demonstrate our fair allocation of interventions
on a real-world dataset.
Dataset. We compiled a dataset on 345 high schools
from the New York City Public School District, largely
from the Civil Rights Data Collection (CRDC)4. The
CRDC collects data on U.S. public primary and secondary
schools to ensure that the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion’s financial assistance does not discriminate ‘on the
basis of race, color, national origin, sex, and disability.’
This dataset contains demographic information, Full-time
School Counselors (F ): the number of full-time coun-
selors employed at school (fractional values indicate part-
time work), AP/IB (P ): whether the school offers Ad-
vanced Placement (AP) or International Baccalaureate
(IB) classes, Calculus (C): whether the school offers Cal-
culus courses, and SAT/ACT-taking (Y ): the percent of
students who take the college entrance examinations, the
SAT and/or the ACT. For simplicity we assign each school a race A according to its majority race out
of the possible groups: black, Hispanic, white.
Setup. In this experiment, we imagine that the U.S. Department of Education wishes to intervene
to offer financial assistance to schools to hire a Calculus teacher, a class that is commonly taken in the
U.S. at a college level. The goal is to increase the number of students that are likely to attend college,
as measured by the fraction of students taking the entrance examinations (via SAT/ACT-taking). It
is reasonable to assume that this intervention is exact. Specifically, if the intervention is given to
school i, i.e., Zi=1, then we assume that the school offers Calculus, i.e., Ci=1. Without fairness
considerations, the Department would simply assign interventions to maximize the total expected
percent of students taking the SAT/ACT until they reach their allocation budget B. However, to
ensure we allocate interventions to schools that will benefit independent of their societal privilege
due to race we will learn a model using the fairness constraints described in eq. (5). We begin by
formulating a causal model that describes the relationships between the variables.
Causal model. The structure of the causal model we propose is shown in Figure 3 (a subset of the
graph is shown for schools i and j). Recall that technically Zi does not directly effect observable
variables. Ci is hidden to the extent that its value is only observable after the action takes place. All
variables directly affect the outcome Yi (SAT/ACT-taking). Frequently schools will allow students
from nearby schools to take classes that are not offered at their own school. Thus we model both
the Calculus class variables C and the AP/IB class variables P as affecting the outcome of students
at neighboring schools. Specifically, we propose the following structural equations for Y with
4https://ocrdata.ed.gov/
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Figure 4: Results for allocating fair interventions for the NYC school dataset. See text for details.
all schools unfair
black
Hispanic
white
fair
⌧=0.084
fair
⌧=0.046
Figure 5: The left-most plot shows the locations of the 345 New York City High Schools, and their
majority race. The remaining plots show the allocations of interventions for each policy.
interference:
E[Yi(z) | ai, pi, fi] = α[ai] max
j∈N(i)
s.t.,zj=1
s(i, j)Cj(zj) + β[ai] max
j∈N(i)
s(i, j)pj + γ[ai]fi + θ[ai] (7)
where Cj(zj) = zj , N(i) refers to the nearby schools of school i (including i), and s(i, j) is the
similarity of schools i and j. We construct both N(i) and s(i, j) using GIS coordinates for each
school in our dataset5: N(i) is the nearest 5 schools to school i and s(i, j) is the inverse distance
in GIS coordinate space. We fit the parameters α,β,γ,θ via maximum likelihood, assuming a
Gaussian noise model for Y .
Results. To evaluate the effect on SAT/ACT-taking when intervening on Calculus courses we
start with null allocation vector z= 0 (i.e., no school has a Calculus course). We then solve the
optimization problem in eq. (5) with the structural equation for Y in eq. (7), and a budget B of
25 schools. The results of the fair model is shown in Figure 4. The left plot shows the number of
interventions allocated to schools by race. The right plot shows the objective value achieved by the
fair and unfair (unconstrained) models. On the far right of the left plot is the unfair allocation. In this
case, all interventions are given to predominantly white schools. When τ is small both predominantly
black and Hispanic schools receive allocations because these schools benefit the least from their race.
As τ is increased Hispanic school allocations increase, then decrease as white schools are allocated.
Figure 5 shows how each policy allocates interventions on a map of New York City. The fair policy
(τ = 0.046, the first set of bars in Figure 4) assigns interventions to predominantly Hispanic and
black schools that have high utility because of things not due to race. Some of these schools are
in neighborhoods with low median income such as North Bronx and North Manhattan6. As τ is
increased (τ=0.084, the seventh set of bars in Figure 4) the allocation includes more majority white
schools, less black schools, and roughly the same number of Hispanic schools. There are more
allocations in Brooklyn and Queens. The only intervention to a majority black school kept is to the
one in the racially-diverse St. George neighborhood of Staten Island7. The unfair policy assigns
5https://data.cityofnewyork.us/Education/School-Point-Locations/jfju-ynrr
6http://uk.businessinsider.com/new-york-city-income-maps-2014-12?r=US&IR=T
7https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/08/us/census-race-map.html
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interventions to schools in traditionally white neighborhoods including lower Manhattan, and lower
Brooklyn, and all allocations are to white schools. Curiously, many of the interventions made by the
unfair model in Manhattan are nearby those made by the fair models to majority Hispanic schools.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we depart from much of the past work on algorithmic fairness by focusing on designing
fair interventions to change the underlying system rather than on fair prediction. We make use of
structural causal models to encode the effects of public policy interventions, including potential
interference. For concreteness we pursued a particular optimization problem where the intervention
has a budget constraint, but the approach can be used for other kinds of optimization problems. We
devised a fairness criterion that allows us to find beneficial interventions while bounding the benefit
to individuals caused by being a member of a privileged group, as determined by the causal model.
We test our method on allocating college-preparatory classes to NYC schools fairly. We found that
when the fairness criterion holds, interventions are given to a more racially diverse set of schools.
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